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Getting the balance right? Party competition on immigration and conflicting 
ideological ‘pulls’  
 
Pontus Odmalm (University of Edinburgh) 
Betsy Super (American Political Science Association) 
 
 
Abstract 
Will a plurality of cleavages ‘pull’ parties in different ideological directions? Are 
these strains particularly troublesome when competing on issues that lack an obvious 
dimensional fit? Are some parties more likely than others to experience these 
tensions? And does it matter? While the essence of the party-political space has 
received substantial coverage, less attention is paid to the effects that multi-
dimensionality may have on issue competition. Comparing British and Swedish 
parties, the article analyses how any contradictory positions have been negotiated, and 
when such tensions are likely to emerge.  
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Introduction 
 
West European polities are in a state of flux. Not only have the actors diversified but 
so have the issues of contention and modes of competition (Katz and Mair, 2002). 
Mainstream parties are thus subject to a novel set of challengers (Harmel and Gibson, 
1995) but also have to deal with the imminent sense of ideological crisis as the 
conversation shifts from ‘visions’ to ‘competence’ (van der Brug, 2004). 
The nature of party systems, and especially their dimensionality, has 
consequently received substantial attention. The literature has scrutinised whether 
contestation takes place along single, dual or multiple cleavages (Enyedi and Deegan-
Krause, 2010), and whether ownership - rather than spatial - competition is becoming 
more prominent (Green, 2007). These changes are likely to impact on the strength of 
party/electorate linkages (Dalton, 2002); on party stances (Dinas and Gemenis, 2010), 
and on the relevance of ideology in the political ‘game’ (Enyedi, 2008). The 
immigration ‘issue’ is one of those new matters that is particularly challenging for 
scholars and parties alike. It not only has a disruptive effect on left-right 
classifications (Benoit and Laver 2007) but also follows a logic of its own as to when 
parties decide to make it a top election priority (Dahlström and Esaiasson, 2011) 
and/or to change their positions (Breunig and Luedtke, 2008).  
Yet surprisingly, less is said about the potential effects that multi-
dimensionality has on party competition, especially on thorny issues like immigration. 
The lack of scholarly attention is attributed to some of the assumptions made. One 
posits that parties may very well exist in multi-dimensional spaces but competition 
continues to be uni-dimensional (van der Brug and van Spanje, 2009). Another 
suggests that the liberal – restrictive axis (regarding immigration control) maps onto 
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the left – right continuum (Bale, 2003). But such conclusions do not fully address two 
important issues. If party systems are characterised by a single fault line, why is the 
centre-left, but not the centre-right, ‘caught between ideology and strategy’ when 
competing on immigration (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2012: 866)? And why 
would the left also push a restrictive line (Hinnfors et al, 2012)?  
This article suggests that not only are party systems characterised by multi-
dimensionality and increased flux but so is the immigration ‘issue’. Mainstream 
parties therefore face a series of challenges stemming from immigration’s 
multifaceted nature, and how it resists being pinned down to a particular fault-line. In 
turn this lends itself to a variety of framing challenges (Lahav and Courtenmanche, 
2012) such that parties may get it electorally ‘wrong’. Attempting to internalise ‘new’ 
issues into ‘old’ cleavages (Hooghe et al, 2002) proves difficult should there be intra-
party disagreements on dimensional fit and societal impact, leading to a crystallising 
of any inherent ideological tensions (van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008).  
Should one accept the existence of multiple dimensions, and if parties adopt 
multiple positions, will this generate a set of conflicting ideological ‘pulls’ when 
engaging with a cross-cutting issues like immigration? These strains should emerge 
when parties’ stances on state-market relations (State Interventionist (SI)/Free Market 
(FM)) conflict with their views on state-individual relations 
(Green/Alternative/Libertarian (GAL)/Traditional/Authoritarian/ Nationalist (TAN). 
The framing challenges presented by immigration therefore captures tensions between 
the FM and TAN aspects of some centre-right parties, and the SI and GAL facets that 
are equally characteristic for some centre-left parties. 
The article is laid out as follows. We first survey how the societal cleavages 
have changed, and whether these shifts impact on party competition, system 
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dimensionality, and on the relationship between ‘ideology’ and ‘immigration’. Our 
research questions, case selection rationale, methodology and operationalisation are 
then discussed and, finally, we present findings from a manifesto analysis which are 
related to a new set of qualitative data (interviews with British and Swedish MPs and 
party strategists).  
While our data suggest ideology to still ‘matter’, it matters in different ways 
for different parties. Class-based parties, especially, tend to find the immigration 
‘issue’ more difficult to deal with than those stemming from the liberal-conservative 
tradition. Yet post-material parties also appear to be in a better position to handle the 
conflicting ‘pulls’ since they often function outside of the established cleavages. But 
parties’ aggregate positions matter as well. When multi-dimensional positioning 
suggests corresponding views on the role of the state, the outcome is often fewer 
framing dilemmas and, consequently, less intra-party conflict over what type of issue 
the immigration ‘issue’ constitutes. And institutions matter as well. But somewhat 
counterintuitively, parties in FPTP-systems experience more difficulties than they do 
in PR-systems due to the greater need for holding together diverse ideological 
coalitions to secure the majority vote. And this is despite the fact that the former tends 
to be associated with valence competition, and a less important role of ideology.  
 
 
The Changing Nature of the Societal Cleavages 
 
Classifying parties along some form of left-right continuum (Budge, 2000; Giljam and 
Oscarsson, 1996) is common practice in political science but the meaning of ‘left’ and 
‘right’ is often so diverse that it is ‘multifaceted at best, elusive at worst’ (Arian and 
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Shamir, 1983:139). This elusiveness stems from prevailing discrepancies regarding 
the meaning, and nature, of the party-ideological space (Huber and Inglehart, 1995). 
The literature is thus characteristically divided between those suggesting a ‘new’, 
post-material divide to supersede the ‘old’, material cleavage (Inglehart, 1997); those 
suggesting the meaning of the ‘left-right’ divide(s) to be the key change (Kriesi et al, 
2006), and those accepting the existence of multi-dimensional dimensions (Hooghe et 
al, 2002). However, what they share is a view that most polities were structured 
around disagreements in the post-war period with parties on ‘the left’ favouring e.g. 
higher levels of collective ownership; taxation and labour market regulation than 
parties on ‘the right’. Later on these differences concerned degrees of party 
acceptance for certain life-style and/or individual choices, or the nature of democracy 
(Inglehart, 1971) but are today increasingly connected to issues of national identity 
and sovereignty (Hooghe et al., 2002). Their labels may indeed have changed but 
these fault lines also appear remarkably static in that the overarching issue still 
concerns the role of the state, albeit in different spheres. For reasons of parsimony, 
however, the article uses Hooghe et al’s terminology - GAL/TAN - when referring to 
the non-material dimension. 
When the relationship between mainstream parties and the immigration ‘issue’ 
is addressed, the literature highlights a variety of variables. These include ideological 
orientation; the presence/success of anti-immigration parties; the number of asylum 
claims or the number of migrants, more generally, present in the host society 
(Rydgren, 2005; Freeman, 1997). Except for ideology, these factors are ‘external’ to 
parties themselves, thereby emphasising their reactions to particular exogenous 
‘shocks’. Given immigration’s complexity, and the associated problems of 
dimensional fit, we seek to shed light on these internal aspects and how parties deal 
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with the potential problems that can arise. We argue that it is the aggregate 
dimensional positions that are the main sources of these ‘pulls’, especially so when it 
comes to an ideologically ambiguous area such as immigration.  
A plurality of cleavages may constitute a challenge for parties when deciding 
on how - and where – to frame their position(s) (Money, 1999). Unless successfully 
circumvented, immigration’s inherent elusiveness presents a series of obstacles. For 
the centre-right, it juxtaposes market-liberal (FM) and socio-culturally conservative 
wings (TAN). The former, mainly present in Liberal Democratic and Conservative 
parties, often advocate for the private sector to have a greater say on the appropriate 
levels of skilled and, sometimes, unskilled labour migration. The latter wing, often 
present in Christian Democratic and Conservative parties, is more hesitant towards 
handing over such a key area of sovereignty to non-state actors. And both wings 
experience conflicting attitudes toward asylum seeker and refugee migration (Bale, 
2003).  
The centre-left faces a similar dilemma. Their traditional inclination to support 
state intervention and regulation of markets (SI) is contrasted with ideas of increased 
personal freedoms and globalised ethical concerns (GAL) which arguably point 
towards less state intervention. For Social Democratic and reformed Left parties, 
trying to limit (labour) migration is justified with reference to retaining good terms 
and conditions in the labour market (Hinnfors et al, 2012). Allowing for 
‘uncontrolled’ entry potentially creates a new – ethnic - underclass and accordingly 
splits the indigenous working class. But centre-left parties – particularly the Greens 
and the reformed Left - also tend to favour generous approaches to asylum seekers 
(Shuster, 2000). These underlying tensions require parties to perform a delicate 
balancing act, and if unsuccessful they are likely to face sustained oppositional 
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criticism (for being too liberal or too restrictive); the potential vote ‘theft’ by the 
populist radical right and/or increased uncertainty regarding which electoral strategies 
to pursue. However, not all parties will experience the same strength of these ‘pulls’. 
Certain positional configurations can work together better since they provide 
corresponding views on the role of the state.  
FM/GAL and SI/TAN-parties should be less likely to experience such strains 
whereas the FM/TAN and SI/GAL-dittos are more likely to be conflicted since their 
positions provide contradictory cues. To not lose out electorally, parties have to 
manage these tensions somehow and internally negotiate what type of ‘issue’ 
immigration constitutes, and along which cleavage it has a better fit. FM/GAL and 
SI/TAN-parties may still experience (some) tension but it should be less challenging 
due to the positional congruence regarding the role of the state.  
Ideology is of course not the only factor determining whether parties are 
conflicted. Other types of institutions, e.g. electoral systems, may equally affect party 
behaviour (Dalton, 2002) and the degree of ‘pull’ they experience. ‘Visions’ may thus 
be less important in FPTP-systems than they are in PR ones (Green-Pedersen, 2007). 
But if this the case then our British data should also reflect this with fewer instances 
of ideological ‘pull’ compared to what we anticipate to find in the Swedish PR-
system. The system-level differences should thus be more pronounced than the party-
family, or ideologico-positional differences that may exist in both cases. 
This leads us to the following hypotheses:  
 
H1. Parties with an SI/GAL or FM/TAN combination are more likely to                    
experience conflicting ideological ‘pulls’ on immigration;  
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H2. Parties with an FM/GAL or SI/TAN combination are conversely less 
likely to experience such strains; 
 
H3. Parties in FPTP-systems are less likely to experience any ‘pulls’ (SI/GAL 
or FM/TAN) compared to parties in PR-systems. 
 
While our main focus is analysing party management of an increasingly divisive 
issue, we also goes beyond the pure case study. Should we not find much evidence for 
the proposed hypotheses then this will allow for a more broadly applicable 
phenomenon to be identified (George and Bennett, 2005) regarding the role of 
ideology for party competition. 
 
 
Data and Methods  
 
Exploring the hypotheses, we examine how the British and Swedish mainstream1 has 
managed these potential strains. In the period covered (1991-2010), both cases 
experienced different types of migratory pressures (Hampshire, 2013); varying 
degrees of public acceptance for the pursued policies (Freeman, 1997), and different 
levels of populist radical right party success at the national level (Mudde, 2004). Yet 
there are also similarities. Parties with an immigration sceptic agenda made noted 
gains during local and EU level elections (Dahlström and Sundell, 2012; Hayton, 
2010), and the - mainstream party - politics of immigration was marked by increasing 
levels of conflict regarding third country labour migration coupled with rising 
concerns over the magnitude of asylum claims (Bale et al, 2010; Hinnfors et al, 
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2012). And both countries experienced the aftermath of ‘[the] transformation//…//in 
the political culture of advanced industrial societies’ (Inglehart 1971:991) suggesting 
that their respective parties compete in a space that is, at the very least, two-
dimensional. Simultaneously, however, Britain continues to operate under a FPTP-
system, at least at the Westminster level, while Sweden has a more ‘classic’ PR-
system with an electoral threshold. This usually results in single-party governments 
with a parliamentary majority in the former whereas in the latter, coalitions and 
parliamentary minorities are the norm. The centripetal forces of the British system are 
thus said to trump any prevailing party differences and ideological strains which, 
conversely, should be more distinct and more relevant in the centrifugal Swedish case 
(Sartori, 1976). Yet these supply and demand, and institutional differences, do not 
provide much theoretical nor empirical foundation to explain why parties would 
experience an internal ideological conflict when considering their stances on 
immigration.  
But we first need to establish positions in the two-dimensional space. This is 
done through a manifesto analysis for all mainstream parties represented in their 
respective national parliaments. Manifestos are here a key data source since they 
‘inform the electorate about the course of action the party will pursue when elected’ 
(Klingemann, 1987:300) and are as such well suited for investigating degrees of 
conflict in comparative perspective (Green-Pedersen, 2007). One should of course be 
careful to equate ‘manifesto’ with ‘party’ position or, even, ‘party direction’ 
(Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006). But as the ‘final word’ prior to an election, manifestos 
are nevertheless what parties present to the electorate and often provide the 
framework for subsequent policy proposals (Walgrave and Nuytemanns, 2009). We 
follow De Lange’s operationalization (2007; see also Pellikaan et al, 2007) and 
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Odmalm’s (2012) subsequent scoring adjustments to capture parties’ expressed 
stances on the SI/FM and GAL/TAN-dimensions.  
Indicators 1-3 (Privatisation; Public Sector and Welfare and Social Security 
System) were scored as follows: (-1) if the statement predominantly indicates the 
party to favour more state intervention, and (+1) if it favours more market influence 
(De Lange, 2007). But since the ‘more state/more market’-dichotomy did not always 
capture certain stances, the following changes were made: (-1) for more regulation, 
and (+1) for less (indicators 4 (Labour Market), and 7 (Trade and Enterprise); (-1) for 
raising, and (+1) for lowering taxes (indicator 5 (Taxation), and (-1) for more public 
spending, and (+1) for less (indicator 6 (Budget Deficit) (Odmalm, 2012).   
The operationalization and scoring system for the GAL/TAN-dimension is 
also modified so as to circumvent the inherent ambiguity and overlap between certain 
categories. Indicators 2 – 4 are kept as is but the wording for the first (‘Diversity of 
Lifestyles’) is rephrased. It now goes beyond merely capturing the extent to which 
governments should ‘interfere in the private domain’ (De Lange, 2007: 420) to 
include attitudes on such diversity as well. De Lange also uses ‘Immigration’ and 
‘Integration of Cultural Minorities’ to capture stances on ‘Citizenship/Ethnocultural 
relations’. The difficulty here is that her definition - ‘statements indicating support for 
an inclusive and universalistic society [or] support for an exclusive and particularistic 
society’ (ibid.)) - mainly relates to ‘Integration’ and also borders on issues of national 
identity/nationalism. And none of the categories cover the, arguably, central ‘new’ 
politics concern of environmental protection vs. economic growth. The scale is 
therefore adjusted so it clearly captures statements relating to ‘National Identity’ 
(indicator 5); ‘Integration’ (indicator 6), and ‘the Environment’ (indicator 7) 
(Odmalm, 2012).  
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(1) Diversity of Lifestyles: Positive (-1), or Negative (+1);  
(2) Favours Individual Freedom (-1), or a Moral Government (+1);  
(3) Favours Direct (-1), or Appointed (+1) Representation;  
(4) Favours More Individual Participation in Decision-Making (-1), or More 
Hierarchical Decision-Making Procedures (+1);  
(5)  National Identity: Less Important (or inclusive) (-1), or More Important 
(or Exclusive) (+1);  
(6) Integration: Inclusive and Universalistic (-1), or Exclusive and 
Particularistic (+1) and  
(7) Environmental Protection (-1), or Economic Growth (+1) being more 
important. 
 
 
This approach differs from that of the two standard data sets - the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (CMP), and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) – when 
identifying degrees of confrontation along two distinct dimensions. While the CMP 
primarily captures issue saliency, it also merges the ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ 
categories into one, unified left-right dimension exaggerating positions as well as the 
positional moves (Benoit and Laver, 2007). The CHES data, conversely, seek to 
remedy this ‘fault’ by asking country experts to classify parties along four substantive 
dimensions – economic; social; loci of decision-making and environmental policy – 
and also adds a ‘direct measure of party positions on a general left-right scale’ (ibid, 
p.91). While avoiding the mathematical constraints of the CMP, the CHES findings 
are also highly dependent on context since ‘the substantive meaning of left-right is not 
constant’ (ibid, p. 103). The analysis conducted here develops a measurement tool 
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that is able to ‘travel’ while also being sensitive to the content, rather than magnitude, 
of statements. Both data sets are however used as comparative benchmarks to check 
the overall validity of our calculations.  
For coding consistency, continuous inter-reliability checks were carried out. 
Statements were initially scored by one author and then passed on to the other to score 
‘blind’. Some discrepancies were identified through this process, e.g. one author 
would score (+1) whereas the other would give it a (0). These instances emerged 
when the concerned quasi-sentences were particularly lengthy, thus prompting a 
discussion, and occasional re-coding, of the score given. 
Quantifying statements accordingly, and then adding them together, provides a 
positional range from -7 to +7 where the closer to -7 a party is, the more SI/GAL its 
stance will be. On the other hand, the closer to +7 a party is, the more FM/TAN its 
position is. We then averaged these positions across the five (UK), and six (SWE) 
elections to get a ‘final’ score which are plotted in a two-dimensional scatter diagram 
(Figure 1).  
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And, finally, parties are grouped together depending on positional configuration 
(Table. 1).  
 
   Table 1. Type of ‘pull’ (grouped by country) 
SI/GAL FM/TAN  SI/TAN FM/GAL 
     
SWEDEN SWEDEN  N/A SWEDEN 
V (-4.7; -2.5) Moderates (4.3; 0.2)     KD (1.8; -0.8) 
MP (-2.5; -3)     FP (3.7; -0.8) 
SAP (-1.3; -1.3) BRITAIN    CP (1.7; -2.7) 
 
Conservatives (4.6; 
0.6)    
    BRITAIN 
    Labour (1.6; -1.4) 
    Lib Dems (0.4; -3.8) 
 
 
To assess the management of any conflicting ‘pulls’ the article invokes semi-
structured interviews with British and Swedish MPs or party strategists (29 in total). 
These centred on a set of pre-arranged themes (ideology; policy position(s) and party 
competition) but also allowed follow-up questions to be asked should answers be 
vague or off-topic (Devine, 2002). 
We drew a purposive sample to ensure maximum variation among those with 
substantive expertise in the areas we were interested in (Patton, 1980), and MPs 
assumed to have particular knowledge of the three themes were initially identified. 
The selection criteria included past, and current, memberships of committee/s (e.g. 
Labour Market, or Home Affairs); position/s held (e.g. political secretary, or 
committee chair), and time as an MP. Due to issues of access, we also employed a 
‘snow-balling’ technique (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981) which led us to interview 
some former MPs and party strategists. The interviews employed open-ended 
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questions asked in a balanced fashion, e.g., ‘some parties favour more state 
intervention in the market, while others want more market freedom. How would you  
describe [party] in these terms?’ The interviews were then transcribed following a 
‘denaturalist’ approach removing any ‘idiosyncratic elements of speech’ (Oliver et al, 
2005: 173-74), and the selected quotes were subsequently checked for relevance 
before incorporated into the article. As an ethical precaution, all interviewees were 
informed that the data would be anonymised for future publications. They were also 
given the option to view the transcript. In a minority of cases changes were suggested 
to be made, primarily relating to incorrect spelling of names or places. Some of the 
validity concerns associated with qualitative data were able to be ‘controlled’ for, 
while others proved more difficult. The material was returned to ‘over and over again 
to see if the constructs, categories, explanations, and interpretations ma[d]e sense’ 
(Patton, 1980: 339), paying special attention to the latter when the quotes were 
incorporated. But they were also revisited to try and identify any emerging patterns 
once the transcripts were compared (e.g. was party ideology portrayed in a similar 
fashion? Were the effects of immigration understood differently depending on 
age/role in party?). But whether ‘the account [accurately] represent[ed] participants’ 
realities of the social phenomena’ (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 124) were more 
challenging as we had to accept that the information we received was a truthful 
account of these ‘realities’. The article thus invokes a ‘mixed methodology’, and a 
‘mixed modelling’ approach to the data (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  
 
 
Findings  
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Table 2. summarises the results. 60% of the parties predicted to experience these 
‘pulls’ also reported doing so (H.1). By comparison 80% of the parties not expected to 
experience any strains behaved accordingly (H.2). The support for H.3 is weaker with 
30% conforming to the predictions made. Each case is discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
Table 2. Ideology predictions (confirmed cases in bold)  
H1. Parties more likely to experience 
conflicting ‘pulls’ (party/party family) 
H2. Parties less likely to experience 
conflicting ‘pulls’ (party/party family) 
SI/GAL 
 
V (Socialist/Social Democratic) 
MP (Green) 
SAP (Socialist/Social Democratic) 
 
FM/TAN 
 
Moderates (Conservative) 
Conservatives (Conservative) 
 
FM/GAL 
 
KD (Religious/Christian Democratic) 
FP (Liberal/Social liberal) 
CP (Liberal/Social liberal) 
Labour Party (Socialist/Social 
Democratic) 
Lib Dems (Liberal/Social liberal)  
 
 
H3. System-level predictions 
 
FPTP (less ‘pulls’) 
 
Conservatives (Conservative) 
Labour Party (Socialist/Social 
Democratic) 
Lib Dems (Liberal/Social liberal)  
 
PR (more ‘pulls’) 
 
V (Socialist/Social Democratic) 
Greens (Greens) 
SAP (Socialist/Social Democratic) 
Moderates (Conservative) 
KD (Religious/Christian Democratic) 
FP (Liberal/Social liberal) 
CP (Liberal/Social liberal) 
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SI/GAL parties 
 
The SI-profiles (Vänsterpartiet (V): -4.7; Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti 
(SAP): -1.3) are confirmed through the interviews. Although both parties are not 
opposed to the ‘market forces’ as such, their key concerns relate to the extent of 
privatisation with V adopting a more interventionist stance (e.g. ‘‘[T]he state should 
[not] own everything [but it] should be a key player and have extensive influence.’ (V 
2)). Miljöpartiet (MP) scores comparatively higher (-2.5) but portray a less clear 
ideological position and a rather pragmatic approach to the political ‘game’ (e.g. 
‘[W]e believe very strongly in individual freedom but also that collective solutions are 
sometimes necessary.’ (MP 1); ‘[W]e don’t fit on the conventional scales. We went 
with the Red bloc because we weren’t able to reach an agreement with the Blues’ (MP 
2)). While confirming their GAL-profiles (V: -2.5; MP: -3; SAP: -1.3), a tension was 
also identified between ‘the individual’ and ‘the collective’. V and SAP more 
obviously struggled to justify state intervention in this sphere (‘[W]e also favour a 
personalised maternity and paternity insurance which is very much about state 
interference.’ (V 1); ‘[This dimension] is more problematic since it requires us to 
decide on things that are not obviously ‘social democratic’’. (SAP 4)). When the two 
ideological streams are transposed to the key categories of newcomers (asylum 
seekers and labour migrants), the dilemma of ‘labour market protectionism’ vs. ‘no 
borders’/’international solidarity’ was clearly identified, exemplified by the following 
quote:  
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‘Persson’s position was indicative of the problems [we] have had when trying 
to juggle the need for low-paid migrant labour and the interests of the native 
workforce//…//Refugees were not considered to push down salaries in the 
same way//…//they are kept outside of the labour market for so long.’ (SAP 
1).  
 
MP appears less constrained by these ideological parameters (‘[S]ometimes we are 
the new social liberal party, sometimes the strong Green party and sometimes the 
party for solidarity.’ (MP 2)) which further facilitated an alignment with the Alliance 
for the labour migration reforms in 2008 (‘We have an ‘open borders’-
approach//…//[so] we could co-operate with them’. (MP 2)). The interview data 
would thus partially support Hs 1. and 3.   
 
 
FM/TAN-parties 
 
The Conservatives show strong FM- (4.6) but moderate, to centrist, TAN-profiles 
(0.6). We thus expect it to be ‘pulled’ by these opposing positions (H1.) but as it also 
functions in a FPTP-system (H3.) any prevailing tensions may very well be trumped 
by an emphasis on ‘issue ownership’ (Green and Hobolt, 2008). The FM-score was 
readily acknowledged (e.g. ‘[W]e are a centre-right party//…//favouring lower taxes, 
less state intervention, etc.’ (Cons. 2)). However, some interviewees also pointed to 
significant difficulties in assessing where ‘the party’ stands alluding to ideological 
inconsistencies between party leaders; between different ministerial posts, and 
between the party and its membership base (e.g. ‘IDS was clearly Thatcherite-right; 
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Howard was Authoritarian-Thatcherite-right, except in some areas where he was, 
funnily enough, a bit of a social-liberal.//…//Defence policy is currently a lot more to 
the right than trade is.’ (Cons. 3); ‘The membership base is a lot more to the ‘right’.’ 
(Cons. 6)). Conversely, the calculated TAN-position corresponds better to the 
interviewees’ understanding of how the party has evolved, especially following 
Cameron’s modernisation push (Bale, 2010; Ellison, 2011). But although certain 
features, particularly regarding alternative lifestyles and defence were moderated (e.g. 
‘[T]he new MPs are//…//more relaxed in their views on e.g. civil partnerships.’ (Cons 
2.); ‘[T]he party has ring-fenced the NHS but not defence’ (Cons 1)), others, e.g. loci 
of decision-making, had been reinforced (e.g. ‘[Cameron] talks about openness, 
transparency, democracy//…//but the way he runs the Conservatives has been the 
complete opposite.’ (Cons. 2)), and had resulted in additional uncertainties over party 
direction and identity -  
 
‘Where do you [Cameron] stand here?//…//You can’t have a Left and a 
Right-wing approach.’ (Cons. 3); ‘[T]he most extreme free marketeers tend to 
be the most authoritarian on social issues.’ (Cons. 4).   
 
These strains are further reflected in the party’s relationship with labour migration. 
Although recognised as economically beneficial, it is also portrayed as overwhelming,  
especially after the EU’s enlargement in 2004 (e.g. ‘[W]e got that unprecedented 
influx of people that the country wasn’t really prepared for.’ (Cons. 2); ‘You have to 
find somewhere for them to live, to go to school, to be treated, and that creates 
pressure.’ (Cons. 5.)), and as a disincentive for dealing with issues of domestic 
unemployment –  
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‘If you have 3 million unemployed then they can fill those positions.’ (Cons 
3.); ‘[Y]ou don’t need to import cheap labour to get the job done.’ (Cons. 5.). 
 
It also seems to reinforce certain TAN-traits, especially of the nationalist type (e.g. 
‘[I]t’s our history and our heritage//…//Immigration evokes those types of quite 
fundamental questions’ (Cons. 5)), and push the party towards a more welfare-state 
chauvinistic position (e.g. ‘[W]hether or not you have a perception that public 
services are being allocated in an unfair way.’ (Cons 4)). These conflicting views also 
characterise the relationship with the asylum category. Although the welcoming of 
people fleeing persecution is considered a ‘British tradition’, these categories are 
equally linked with concerns over fairness (e.g. ‘[W]hat you have to pay out now, and 
what you get back later, that equation does not work out in the taxpayers’ favour.’ 
(Cons. 5.)), and with the erosion of national sovereignty (e.g. ‘[O]ur ability to control 
immigration has gone down to zero.’ (Cons. 7)). And while ‘numbers’ are identified 
as a key policy concern it is not obvious what type of issue(s) they constituted, or 
what strategy the party should pursue, as one MP puts it –  
 
‘[We] need to control numbers and be seen to be able to do this [but] do you 
want to send out an image that you are going to be hostile or nasty towards 
migrants?’ (Cons. 6).  
 
These framing difficulties meant that the party got it electorally ‘wrong’ on several 
occasions (e.g. ‘Every time that tactic has been made explicit, it has not worked’ 
(Cons 6)).  
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The Moderates underwent a major transformation in time for the 2006 election 
and adjusted their views on, e.g., taxation and ‘the Swedish model’ (Widfeldt, 2007) 
yet their average score nevertheless places them firmly on the FM-side (4.3). 
Questions of state/market-relations appear comparatively easier for the party to deal 
with (e.g. ‘[W]e believe in market solutions to economic problems.’ (Moderates 3))., 
but the weak TAN-position (0.2) hints at non-economic issues being more challenging 
(e.g. ‘Those questions constitute, perhaps not an identity crisis, but definitely a 
challenge.’ (Moderates 3)). The ‘liberal-conservative’-tag suggests a clear ideological 
steer on ‘state-individual’-relations (e.g. ‘[T]he individual should//…//decide more 
and the state less’ (Moderates 1)) but it also indicates a more complicated relationship 
regarding the limits of certain freedoms, and the challenges involved when negotiating 
e.g. alternative lifestyles vs. traditional values (e.g. ‘[They] were against it because 
they thought marriage should follow the traditional religious traditions.’ (Moderates 
1)), or national security vs. personal integrity (e.g. ‘[W]e are more in favour of CCTV 
and monitoring [today].’ (Moderates 2)). The expressed views on labour migration –  
 
‘[i]f a company says, ‘We need these Indian technicians’ then they are  
probably right.’ (Moderates 1)  
 
- thus fit with the party’s FM-position but asylum seems to reinforce certain TAN 
characteristics, particularly regarding ‘authoritarianism’ (e.g. ‘[W]e proposed a 
contract//…//accepting fundamental democratic values, human and women’s rights, 
etc.’ (Moderates 2)) yet was simultaneously counter-pulled by a strong GAL 
understanding of mobility –  
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‘[P]eople should be able to move and settle wherever they want’ (Moderates 
2).  
 
Again the data partially support Hs.1 and H.3. While the Conservatives are subject to 
considerable inter-ideological strain, the Moderates are not necessarily ‘pulled’ by 
different dimensions but rather experience an intra-dimensional tension stemming 
from the TAN-position bordering the GAL-sphere.   
  
 
FM/GAL-parties  
 
Kristdemokraterna’s (KD) FM- (1.8) and GAL-scores (-0.8) suggest a degree of 
tension given the latter’s proximity to the adjacent dimension (e.g. ‘[Regarding] the 
family//…//we advocate very little state interference [but] many of our welfare 
policies are very much geared towards extensive state intervention.’ (KD 1)). While it 
was initially difficult for KD to relate to, and place itself on, the left-right – scale, an 
expanding issue agenda had clarified their party identity (‘[W]e have matured//…//not 
least regarding the economic [questions]. It doesn’t mean that we moved further to the 
right but rather clarified our position.’ (KD 2))  
The interviewees thus acknowledge KD’s economic centre-right position but 
express a more nebulous understanding of its GAL/TAN-placement (‘[W]e share 
certain views with V, on refugees e.g.//…//[W]e obviously differ regarding what the 
value base should be, Christian for us and human rights for them (KD 1)). Yet these 
potential strains does not appear to affect KD’s relationship with neither labour nor 
asylum migration (H.2 and H.3) –  
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‘[m]ore flexible//…//policies is a great way to deal with global poverty//…// 
We believe in open borders and we don’t like the idea of Fortress Europe’ 
(KD 1)). 
Folkpartiet (FP) has had to balance market- and social-liberal tendencies, where the 
emphasis on either strand has shifted over time (e.g. ‘‘[W]e switched a lot, going to 
the left, to the right, back again, etc’ (FP 2)). While the FM-traits (3.7) are 
acknowledged, the interviewees also recognised how the party was ‘pulled’ in an SI 
and TAN direction (e.g. ‘The party is not particularly liberal on certain issues, e.g. on 
alcohol, and rather interventionist in some welfare sectors.’ (FP 3)). These 
complicated relationships with ‘liberalism’ have somewhat surprisingly not caused 
much intra-party fragmentation but served to reignite dormant ideological discussions 
about party direction and identity (e.g. ‘[T]here is always a lot discussion between the 
social-liberal Liberals and the classic liberal Liberals, e.g. what is liberalism? What 
should it be?’ (FP 2)). However, given the equally low GAL-score (-0.8), the classic-; 
market-; and social-liberal wings are occasionally juxtaposed, especially regarding 
certain ‘freedom’-issues (‘[I]t definitely creates tension//…//between the more 
authoritarian and the more libertarian groups.’ (FP 3)). An identified challenge was 
how the term ‘liberal’ was subject to concept-stretching and adopted by different MPs 
regardless of ideological affiliation (e.g. ‘[In the debates] everyone uses ‘liberalism’ 
as a form of alibi’//…//(FP 2)). This suggests greater levels of uncertainty and 
ideological strain regarding the different migratory types. But labour migration is 
portrayed according to the party’s FM-score (e.g. ‘You want to come here and work? 
Sure.’ (FP 2); ‘//…//it should be up to the employer to decide.’ (FP 3)). Although 
asylum remained a non-issue, family reunification was an increasing source of 
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conflict, especially since entering a governing position in 2006 (e.g. ‘[S]ome wanted 
stricter rules and more demands//…//others were saying it should be liberalised.’ (FP 
2)). (H.2 and H.3).   
The reformed agrarian party, Centerpartiet (CP), also embarked on an ideological re-
orientation but unlike the Moderates, they moved further in the FM-direction. The 
emphasis thus shifted to ‘the individual’ and ‘the free market’ but balanced with a 
focus on ‘green issues’ (e.g. ‘[W]e are more obviously a liberal and bourgeois party 
today but with a strong attachment to ‘green’ questions’ (CP 3)). The average scores 
thus correspond to where the interviewees consider the party to be located. However, 
the estimated FM- (1.7) and GAL-positions (-2.7) likely underplay CP’s significant 
ideological shift (e.g. ‘The key change is how we’ve quite clearly moved towards the 
economic right.’ (CP 4) 
.  The solid FM and GAL positions are, as expected, echoed in CP’s views on 
migration (H.2 and H.3). Labour migration is portrayed as unproblematic and an issue 
best suited for the employers, rather than the state, to decide upon (e.g. ‘[T]he 
employer//…//should have more say regarding who comes in.’ (CP 1); ‘[I]f you get 
offered a job, why shouldn’t you be allowed to move here?’ (CP 2)). 
We also expected less strain regarding asylum. Although the MPs emphasised 
how CP is committed to the treaties signed up for, they also suggested an intra-party 
shift being underway where immigration – in general – should be facilitated rather 
than constrained. It was thus acknowledged how ‘the party ha[d] become a lot more 
positive toward migration’ but was also linked back to certain core party values such 
that ‘it [becomes] clear that we should also be in favour of//…//free mobility.’ (CP 1). 
The Labour Party underwent a similar ideological transformation culminating 
in the landslide victory of New Labour in 1997 (Heath et al, 2001). The party thus 
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acknowledged, if not embraced, the beneficial role of the market forces (‘[Y]ou got 
private companies involved in//…//public services. Very few would envision [us] 
pushing for this previously.’ (Lab 4)), and have gradually moved towards an FM-
position coupled with a strong emphasis on social justice (Glyn and Wood, 2001). 
Again, less ideological tension is expected due to the congruence between its FM- 
(1.6) and GAL-positions (-1.4), and how Labour functions in an FPTP-system (H.2 
and H.3).     
These shifts were recognised by the interviewees. The key changes concerned 
Labour’s views on state ownership; labour market structure and taxation (e.g. 
‘[D]ropping Clause 4 is really the key change here.’ (Lab 3); ‘[There is] less 
protection if you are made unemployed//…//[b]ut the rest of Europe has a consistently 
higher rate of unemployment’ (Lab 1); ‘By not increasing income tax as much//…//we 
also lost the image of being the party of high taxes.’ (Lab 2), and has moved it toward 
the same sphere as the Conservatives. The GAL-position, conversely, has remained 
relatively stable (e.g. ‘We have always been the small ‘L’ liberal party on these 
questions.’ (Lab 2)), putting it closer to the Lib Dems. These changes should thus 
have filtered through to how the party engages with the different migratory types. 
However, the interviews suggest similar tensions to those experienced by the 
Conservatives (H.3). Labour migration is not only acknowledged to benefit the 
overall economy but also raises questions about labour market protectionism -  
 
‘[T]he unions were very concerned about how further immigration would 
affect wage levels and workers’ rights.’ (Lab 3). 
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The scores may therefore not accurately reflect some of the SI and TAN-remains from 
Labour’s previous incarnation. Asylum migration equally subjected the party to 
further internal divisions. Partly between ideological commitments, and partly 
between negotiating how social justice should be applied, and to whom (e.g. ‘To be 
fair to those that genuinely need protection, you have to protect the system.’ (Lab 1)).  
For the Lib Dems the degree of tension could in fact be stronger given their 
weak FM- (0.4) but strong GAL-profiles (-3.8) yet any strains should be largely 
redundant given the institutional setting they are in (H.3). Confirming the former 
position (e.g. ‘I don’t want the shops to be run by the state but I don’t want private 
companies to run the railways.’ (Lib Dems 1)), the party is also described as ‘centre-
left’ (e.g. ‘Centre-left and liberal, those are the key things really.’ (Lib Dems 2)) 
suggesting potential tensions between key instincts of being market-, as well as 
welfare state-, friendly (e.g. ‘[T]he difference is that we think that there should also be 
a strong safety net.’ (Lib Dems 4)). While their low FM-score signals a strain between 
the FM- and SI-wings, the GAL-position appears more solid (e.g. ‘[V]oters link us 
with civil liberties, identity cards and the environment.’ (Lib Dems 2)) (Russell and 
Fieldhouse, 2005). The ambivalent position regarding state-market relations 
anticipates an equally hesitant approach to labour migration but our data suggest the 
opposite. Although one interviewee highlights some SI-objections –  
 
‘[Y]ou need to make a fair assessment of how many people and what type of 
skills you need’ (Lib Dems 3) 
 
- their FM-orientation is discussed more frequently (e.g. ‘You widen the market and 
the economic base, [so] it’s still a free market view on migration that we have.’ (Lib 
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Dems 4)). The clear GAL-position is also reflected in the party’s stance on 
asylum/refugees where solidarity has been a prime concern (‘[I]t is civilised people’s 
duty to look after people, from whatever country, who are fleeing genuine persecution 
and terror’ (Lib Dems 3)) (Hs.2 and 3). 
Opposing ideological stances thus make positioning on immigration a 
challenge but the SI/GAL-configuration appears more difficult to negotiate than the 
FM/TAN-combination. While this was expected, we did not fully anticipate the 
former category to be so much more problematic than the latter (H.1). Parties based 
around class - and class conflict - may thus find it harder to reconcile immigration’s 
(negative) economic impact with its (positive) socio-cultural effects compared to the 
(positive) economic but (negative) socio-cultural effects we assumed to cause 
indecisiveness for the FM/TAN-parties.  
The FM/GAL-category was conversely not expected to experience much 
tension. This was confirmed by all parties, except for Labour where the interviews 
suggest some SI ‘remains’ still being present which continue to influence the 
relationship with immigration. But we also found that ideological tension is not 
necessarily detrimental but can stimulate further discussion regarding party identity 
and direction. And, finally, are parties in FPTP-systems less affected by these ‘pulls’ 
than they are in PR-systems? On the contrary, what the interviews suggest is that 
parties - in both cases - are subject to such strains, especially if they have conflicting 
views on the role of the state (Conservatives; V and SAP), and should any attempts to 
get balance ‘right’ not yet have filtered through (Labour).  
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Conclusion 
 
Our main objective was to establish whether opposing ideological positions – in 
multi-dimensional spaces – generate any conflicting ‘pulls’ when parties engage with 
the immigration ‘issue’. Through a manifesto analysis, and being sensitive to the 
institutional context, we predicted which parties that would be more and less likely to 
experience such strains. Three hypotheses were then explored using qualitative data 
from a series of semi-structured interviews. A secondary aim was to assess the alleged 
decline of ‘visions’ in political life. If the anticipated strains were not recognised, or 
perceived as particularly problematic, then this would allow us to make more general 
conclusions regarding the role of ideology. The findings suggest three developments. 
First, ideology (still) matters, but its relevance does not apply equally or in the same 
way. The identified ‘pulls’ appear stronger within class-based parties than within 
liberal-conservative ones - regardless of context. This suggests how the centre-right 
can have more to gain from emphasising the immigration ‘issue’ (Bale, 2003) but 
equally how some centre-left parties may have more to lose should the conversation 
steer towards welfare state/labour market protectionism, an area increasingly 
emphasised by the populist radical right.    
MP constitutes an anomaly for our study however. The manifesto analysis 
suggests clear ideological tension but the interviews establish these to be largely 
absent. As a ‘new’ left party, it operates according to a different set of ideological 
parameters making them difficult to characterise and classify. While ideology still 
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‘matters’ for the ‘Socialist’ parties, it appears less relevant, and subsequently less 
divisive, for this ‘post-material’ party.  
Second, positions (still) matter. Should parties have conflicting views on the role of 
the state, it usually translates into conflicting views on the effect(s) of immigration as 
well. They therefore find it difficult to decide on what type of ‘issue’ it constitutes. 
However, the weak TAN-ratings for the Conservatives and the Moderates, raise 
interesting questions for how variability within each ideological pairing matters for 
the strength of these ‘pulls’. Although spatially close to each other, the FM/TAN- 
combination appears more problematic for the former than it does for the latter. 
Degrees of dimensional saliency may of course be important here, and the ‘old’ 
cleavage is usually in the foreground in Swedish politics (Sundberg, 1999) whereas in 
Britain, it is one of several divides that compete for attention (Hopkins, 2009). But 
should the Conservatives be indicative of such additional tensions, then placement on 
the this dimension alone may represent an extra source of strain as any 
‘modernisation’ programmes engage members of different views and with different 
issue priorities.  
For those parties that got the balance ‘right’ such cross-cutting questions may 
be less troublesome and thus less likely to cause intra-party divisions, or further 
fragmentation. While the article supports the premise of competition being 
increasingly characterised by a series of choices of whether (or not) to emphasise 
certain positions/issues, it also identifies a potential determinant for this emphasis 
beyond that posited by ‘issue ownership’ theory. If parties face increased ideological 
tension, and should they also get the balance ‘wrong’, it may not necessarily matter if 
they own the cross-cutting issue (or not) since the unresolved ideological matters can 
lead to further confusion regarding party identity and direction.   
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Third, institutions, and electoral systems in particular, (still) matter and play 
an important role in this negotiating process. The British data highlight how FPTP-
systems more readily encourage broad programmatic appeals where portraying 
competence often supersedes the experienced ‘pulls’. Yet this ‘catch-all’ approach 
also increases the necessity to put together ideologically diverse coalitions in order to 
win a majority, or at least a plurality, of votes. This further emphasises the importance 
of getting the balance, at least partially, ‘right’ so as to reconcile any ideological 
differences. The evidence presented here points to this being a fruitful area of further 
inquiry but since only one of each system was incorporated, any firm conclusions are 
premature.  
Ideology would thus appear to be alive (Fukuyama, 1992) but instead of 
providing clarity and direction it often generates very conflicting views, particularly 
on cross-cutting issues, and especially so when the party-political spaces are 
characterised by multiple cleavages. Establishing how affected parties are by these 
‘pulls’ helps to explain the more general trend toward selective emphasis - a strategy 
increasingly associated with ‘issue ownership’ competition -; why mainstream parties 
tend to downplay immigration’s electoral significance, or how they choose to outright 
not deal with it. 
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1 We define ‘mainstream party’ as one that is likely to be a ‘dominant force[s] in the formation of 
government’ (Ackland and Gibson, 2013:235), or act as a ‘junior’ partner in this process (either in a 
formal coalition or as an informal supporter in parliament) and would therefore be able to influence 
policy and/or the agenda. This thus excludes several, predominantly regionalist, parties e.g.the SNP 
and the Plaid Cympru; parties classified as radical/extremist/far-right (e.g. UKIP; the BNP and the 
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Sweden Democrats) (Betz, 1994), and several smaller parties (primarily in Britain) such as the 
Democratic Unionist Party and the Greens. 
